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Divine Action, Compatibilism, and Coherence Theory:
A Response to Russell, Clayton, and Murphy
NIELS HENRIK GREGERSEN
It is one of the treats of the J. K. Russell lectureship to receive such generous and
challenging responses as those offered by Nancey Murphy, Philip Clayton and
Robert John Russell. Their writings, and numerous conversations with each of
them, have influenced my own work significantly. Now they push me to clarify
my place on the map of the current dialogue between theology and the sciences,
especially as relating to leading research programs developed under the aegis of
The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS). Murphy focuses on my
methodology, Clayton on biology and theology, and Russell on the relation
between physics and complexity studies for understanding divine action.
My response will begin in the reverse order, thus moving from physics and
biology to methodology. By focusing on the subject matter of divine action and
compatibilism(s), I hope to be able to answer also the important methodological
questions raised to me by Murphy and Clayton.
Ontological versus nomological compatibilism
Robert John Russell, during the last twenty years, has been for me a spiritual
companion and intellectual partner of first rate. He now poses questions to me in
print that we have discussed in conversations for quite some years. Does the shift
from the mechanical worldview of classical physics to the network view arising
out of complexity studies after all matter for the problematic of divine action? It is
Russell’s suspicion that since computational theory is not a theory of fundamental
physics, complexity theory may not be of central relevance for conceptualizing a
theological view of divine action in the physical world. According to Russell,
quantum mechanics, and only quantum mechanics, provides a possible locus for
an incompatibilist divine action, that is, a divine action that transcends the
determinist physical processes known from classical physics.
On this background Russell challenges me to choose between one or two
options: either follow Arthur Peacocke’s compatibilist solution (according to
which ‘‘God’s activity is merely being manifested in or perhaps as nature’’), or Ian
Barbour’s incompatibilist view of divine action (according to which nature
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exhibits ‘‘a fundamental indeterminacy, in which God can work beyond, even
sustaining and working through, the deterministic processes of nature’’).1
In order to answer this question properly, I find it necessary to make a
distinction between ontological and nomological compatibilism. I actually affirm an
ontological compatibilism concerning the relation between individual divine
actions and natural events. That is, there is no natural event, which is not
immediately created by God. Since divine creation is not a remote control affair,
divine actions in the world of creation (opera Dei ad extra) necessarily coincide with
natural events. The alternatives to this view are either the view that we live in a
two-stock world of creation with separate spiritual and natural domains, or a two-
principles doctrine, according to which God is only one factor in the universe
alongside an eternal principle of material energy, which is not created by God.
However, if God is the creator of all-that-is, and all creatures are materially based,
how else and where else could God be creative than in and through natural events
and processes? All God’s actions are thus both immediate from the point of view
of divine agency, but mediated by virtue of the simple that no divine action can
take place outside of the natural nexus. Natural events always equal divine-
activity-in-and-through-nature. My basic position is here indeed similar to Arthur
Peacocke’s, and in my view, Peacocke’s position reflects a classic Christian
commitment, reformulated under the ‘‘naturalist’’ assumption that the world is
one, and not two.2
At the same time, however, I would subscribe to a nomological incompatibilism
concerning the relation between divine action and scientific descriptions of nature’s
law-like behavior. That is, the laws of nature, even the deterministic ones, do not
have the ontological status of necessitating specific outcomes that God would
have either to conform to, or to violate. Divine actions may sometimes be
describable as being fully understandable (thus ‘‘compatible’’) with scientifically
well-known patterns of regularity, but may at other times transcend what can
be described through our known scientific laws of nature. Divine action/
natural events may thus be weakly incompatible with scientific descriptions of
law-like behavior, in so far as quite many events fall outside of the domain of
scientific predictions (such as the election of Schwarznegger as governor
of California), while other events are unforeseeable, either for practical reasons
or in principle, from the point of scientific laws (such as the future of homo
sapiens). A divine action/natural event would similarly be strongly incompatible
with scientific laws, if these laws did not a priori permit the very possibility of
its occurrence.
I admit that this view of the laws of nature is itself motivated by philosophical
and theological concerns. Thus, I do not assume that the web of natural events and
processes make up one undivided tapestry that can be treated as one causally
closed universe a la modo Spinoza or Einstein. Rather, on the premises of
evolutionary thinking, and on the basis of plurality of existing sciences (each with
their separate domains or aspects of explanation), I do not endorse a synthetic
naturalism, which pretends that nature is made up of one piece with a unified
structure that can be explained either from a particular branch of science (earlier
physics, nowadays often evolutionary theory), or from a synthesis of all sciences.
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The strongest scientific research programs are working piecemeal, either domain-
specific (in touch with specific empirical phenomena) or aspect-specific (such as
fundamental theoretical physics). The hope for a unification of all sciences has
been dead since the 1940’s, but high claims of having ‘‘explained consciousness’’
(Daniel Dennett) or having ‘‘explained religion’’ (Pascal Boyer) are still with us,
though they are less than convincing. By contrast I am committed to the (more
genuine, I think) evolutionary view that fundamental physics has paved the way
for the evolution of distinctness, so that the end-result is a pluralist universe.
Ontological pluralism is probably the deeper reason behind the fact of explanatory
pluralism.
Though I am not a process philosopher myself, I share the pluralist intuitions
of Whitehead, and I am here probably closer to Ian Barbour’s position than to
more holistic interpretations of nature that treat nature as being ‘‘of one
piece.’’3 As I am going to argue below: Even if the deterministic models of
classical physics provided an exact (1:1) description of a deterministic universe,
physical processes have in fact given rise to an indeterministic universe with
many local processes, such as those of biological systems, that no longer
behave in accordance with the explanatory expectations of classical physics.
Thus, the complexification of nature does matter, also for conceptualizing a
sustainable view of divine action. I thus propose a new emphasis on what has
traditionally been called ‘‘special divine actions.’’ It seems to me that many
cases of special divine are to be seen as weakly incompatible with scientific laws,
including for example incarnation and resurrection, rather than as strongly
incompatibilist ‘‘miracles.’’
From anthropological to theological compatibilism
The compatibilism-incompatibilism divide needs some further specification.
The very terminology derives from the century-long discussions of the relation
between human free will and determinism. Compatibilism is here the view that
the human will can be said to be free, even in a pre-determined universe, in so far
as human agents freely or unencumbered do what they want to do. This argument
can be traced back at least to Augustine (354 – 430) who, in his later anti-Pelagian
writings, claimed that the human will is phenomelogically free in so far as the will
is not coerced by outside forces. Willing means wanting something, and a will can
therefore, by definition, not be forced. Nonetheless, according to Augustine, the
eventual choices of the human will (at least in existential matters) follow by
necessity in so far as persons act in accordance with their own deepest
predispositions and desires. In short, human persons act non coacte, sed necessario.
In post-Reformation thought, thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) and
David Hume (1711 – 1776) generalized this compatibilist model of the relation
between human freedom and divine predestination into a compatibilist theory
about human freedom and a universe ruled by deterministic laws of nature.
In both cases, compatibilists claim that there exists no conflict between having a
free will and being in a situation, in which one only can wish to do one thing.
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Compatibilism is therefore also called ‘soft determinism’ in contrast to a ‘hard
determinism’ that simply eliminates human freedom.
The alternative incompatibilism then argues that compatibilism (by virtue of the
so-called Consequence Argument) is not a viable solution for the following
reasons:
(1) Provided that no final agent has power over the past and the laws of physics,
and
(2) Provided that the laws of physics are deterministic so that only one future is
possible,
(3) It follows that no final agent has power to make other choices than he or she
actually does.
The incompatibilist thus argues that if the premises (1) and (2) are correct, there
cannot exist a human freedom to pursue different ends under the same
circumstances. The counter-argument by Hume and followers was then to make
the counterfactual statement that if a human were placed in another situation, he
or she might have other desires and might make other choices, though they would
still come down to the one solution compatible with the determining context of
physical laws. This discussion between compatibilists and incompatibilists still
goes on vehemently in current philosophy.4
Note, however, that the picture changes significantly if we discuss theological
compatibilism rather than anthropological compatibilism. Regarding premise
(1) two things differ markedly: Being the creator (or the first principle) of the
universe, divine agency does neither work under the confines of externally pre-set
initial conditions, nor under externally imposed laws of nature.5 Rather, the laws
of nature themselves express God’s creative action. Since it is hard to imagine a
principled conflict between what God freely wills and what God freely does, one
should be aware that a theological compatibism is more commonsensical than the
corresponding anthropological compatibilism. Regarding premise (2), a similar
change of problematic occurs. From a theological perspective, the laws of physics
(even if they were eventually deterministic) do not have status of unalterable laws,
since God is their creator and not their victim.
Defusing the NIODA-IODA divide?
These points would, I take, be fully granted by Russell. But how then
conceptualize God’s transformative actions in evolution? In his response to me,
Russell operates with three basic types of divine action: (1) non-interventionist and
incompatibilist special divine action (at the level of quantum processes), (2) non-
interventionist and compatibilist general divine action (at the level of classical
physical processes), and (3) interventionist and incompatibilist special divine action (in
the case of miracles).
Russell is known to be one of the prime architects of the so-called NIODA-model
of divine action (Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action), developed within
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the CTNS-Vatican project on divine action. All divine actions are thus mediated by
natural agency, and God works without interrupting the normal workings of
nature. In his response to me Russell is now declaring himself to be a proponent
also of an IODA-model (Interventionist Objective Divine Action). Miracles (he
mentions Exodus, the healings reported in the New Testament, the incarnation
and the resurrection of Jesus) are, according Russell, best described as divine
interventions. For miracles, incarnation and resurrection seem to be exceptions
from law, neither expressions of nature’s ordinary workings nor to be explained
away as first-instantiation of new stable laws of nature. Earlier I have only seen
Russell argue for an IODA concerning the physical resurrection of Jesus.6 In his
response he seems (for the first time?) to take a more principled reservation
concerning a thorough NIODA-model.
This is probably not the place to discuss miracles in more detail. Let me
nonetheless say that I am reticent to accept a concept of ‘‘miracles,’’ which is
a priori defined negatively as that which flatly conflicts with laws of nature as
understood after Newton, Einstein and Bohr. It seems to me, first, to be an
anachronism to view all wonders as necessarily strongly incompatible with
scientific descriptions.7 If pressed by Russell, I must nonetheless concede that
many reported miracles in the New Testament flatly contradict modern as well as
ancient worldview assumptions. ‘‘Dead people don’t walk.’’ However, I do not
think that the role of the theologian is necessarily to ‘‘affirm’’ miracles simply
because they are reported in the Bible. One thing is that a good portion of
historical skepticism may be at place. Another thing is that some miracle stories
may be seen as teasers that challenge our preconceptions about what is possible
and what is not possible. The miracle stories around Jesus are in the New
Testament itself understood as ‘‘signs’’ (e.g. Mark 13:22; John 2:11), that is, as
teasers that facilitate an understanding of Jesus as Christ. Still, did all the reported
miracles happen, or not? The honest answer is, I fear, that we do not know, and
can never come to know. As for me, I therefore prefer to have my preconceptions
teased by miracle stories, rather than having them rationally explained as that
which is ‘‘supernatural.’’ For the problem with the distinction between what is
‘‘natural’’ and what is ‘‘supernatural’’8 is that the supernatural is defined
negatively as that which is supposed to happen contrary to natural capacities. My
theological counter-position would be that miracles show us what the capacities of
nature can be, or potentially could be.9
Let me rather discuss the standard distinction between general and special
divine action, as used by Russell. Russell’s taxonomy has the advantage of being
built on different forms of scientific laws. There is thus a high degree of contact
between forms of divine actions and forms of scientific laws. This strategy,
however, may also have its costs from a theological perspective. First, I do not feel
too comfortable with a theological view of ‘‘special divine actions’’ that happen so
to speak on the top of God’s ‘‘general divine activity’’ in the ordinary workings of
nature. I fear this is a too anthropomorphic picture of God and divine agency. The
distinction between general and special divine action is modeled on finite agents
who are doing something routinely (like driving a car), while doing other things
with particular efforts and attention (like suddenly putting on the brakes and
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making a special maneuver). I believe there is an alternative, which is to defuse the
standard distinction between special and general divine.
In the 2003 Capstone CTNS-Vatican Conference on divine action, I argued that
divine activity should be seen as series of special divine actions (SDAs).
Accordingly, the notion of general divine action (GDA) should not be taken as
a default position in the dialogue between theology and science, that is, as a view
that both liberals and conservatives could agree on. In my view, the term ‘‘general
divine action’’ does not refer properly to a specific category of divine actions, but
is shorthand for the analytical purpose of referring to recurring patterns of God’s
actions with and in the world of nature. In short, the concept of special divine action
should be given ontological priority over against the concept of general divine action.
The ordinary workings of nature are the net results of myriads of individual
events that are each individually created and sustained by God’s creativity.10
I have here in fact been immensely inspired by the NIODA quantum proposal as
developed particularly by Russell and Murphy, George Ellis and Thomas Tracy. It
seems to me that the quantum proposal exemplifies the distinction between
ontological and nomological compatibilism. Thus, the quantum proposal can be
reformulated as a locus for incompatibilist divine action with respect to laws,
though the proposal at the same time can be said to favor a compatibilist view of
the relation between divine actions and quantum events. For on the interpretation
of Russell and colleagues, it is divine agency and not chance, which is finally
deciding the individual quantum outcomes.
What I find especially attractive about the quantum proposal is exactly its
possibility for reemphasizing God’s operational presence in the most basic
processes of nature known to us. Any spatial distinction between God and nature
evaporates, for as expressed by Russell elsewhere, ‘‘what we normally take as
‘nature’ is in reality the activity of ‘Godþnature’’’; accordingly, ‘‘we do not know
what the world would be like without God’s action.’’11 The question then is how to
cash out this view of divine action in relation to quantum theory. It seems to me
that the theological insight is best articulated when God is conceived to be at work
in determining the collapse of the wave function pervasively rather than on an
ad-hoc basis. I here agree with Murphy’s votum: ‘‘both doctrine and logic suggest
that if God acts at all, God is acting in everything that happens.’’12
Now Robert John Russell and Thomas Tracy hypothesize that God may choose
to perform a special divine action or refrain from such action, and just let things
pass in their ordinary workings. The reason for this move is probably the scientific
concern of not violating the over-all probability distribution. On this issue,
however, one can argue that a probabilistic law cannot really be violated within a
finite time scale.13 Nonetheless, any scientific theory of a certain probability rate
will become more and more implausible, if, say, a dice continues to give ‘6’ more
than 100 times in a row. One would begin to wonder whether the dice is strongly
loaded. My theological proposal would here be that the actual outcomes of
quantum events are ‘ontologically’ never ‘purely’ statistical, since there exists no
nature solo, without God (Russell’s own point). Thus understood, divine action
coincides with the actual outcomes in the actual universe that we inhabit. The outcomes
would only be plainly random (‘ontological indeterminist’ in an ultimate sense),
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if not God were not operationally present in the quantum world. On the view
defended here, quantum systems are only ‘ontological indeterminist’ in a
penultimate sense. The point of the particularist version of quantum SDA could
then be redeemed by stating that God’s selection of quantum events does not
always have the form of a unilateral control (as in classic-style theological
determinism). Divine SDAs have a variety of forms, and our probabilistic laws
reflect the world God has chosen to create, the actual world. The only reason for
making a distinction between special and general divine action is that God may
act differently in different events (and thus may appear to be determinative in
some situations, flexible in other). However, we can never disentangle what is
divine and what is natural in an event, because they are one.
On this view, there is no causal joint in terms of a third neutral meeting ground,
nor any possibility of tracking the route from God to world.14 Rather, the causal
joint can only be the very creatures themselves: a nature gifted and burdened by
God’s giving existence and operational power.
Special divine action and determinism
I am well aware that it is not immediately relevant for a scientific approach to
reality to give special divine action ontological priority. Science comes into being
by bracketing metaphysical, axiological and theological questions. The majestic
task of the physical sciences remains to provide formal mathematical models for
explaining universal aspects of nature. I believe, however, that a singularist view
of divine action is of central importance for the science-religion dialogue, insofar
as it relates to a live debate within the philosophy of science concerning the status
of the laws of nature. The singularist view thus provides theological motivation
for not treating physical laws of nature (be they deterministic, or not) as
ontologically ultimate and prescriptive.
Theology should here not simply retreat to dogmatic statements. Rather,
theology should concern itself with the current philosophical debate concerning
the status of our so-called ‘‘laws of nature.’’ Only by entering into a clear
coherence relations with non-theological truth-candidates, can a theological
position be epistemologically warranted. Concerning the laws of nature, one
must first make a distinction between scientific descriptions of the laws of nature,
and the putative ‘‘laws of nature’’ themselves. Next, one must clarify whether
such ‘‘laws of nature’’ should be treated as having a Platonic status, existing
independent of and prior to their material manifestations, or whether the idea of
‘‘laws of nature’’ should be seen as real-word regularities, which (under some
conditions) are so persistent, that it is appropriate to dub them, in an Aristotelian
vein, ‘‘laws of nature.’’ I here agree with Bill Stoeger that scientific laws are to be
seen as ‘‘approximate description which reflect the underlying regularities and
constraints in the physical, chemical and biological world, but not the
independently existing enforcers of that behavior.’’15
I hereby endorse a regularity view of the laws of nature that serves as a
reminder that the laws of physics, even when they are deterministic in their
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mathematical form, do not offer an exhaustive picture of the real-world
regularities-and-irregularities, nor are prescriptive in the sense that a specific
event must necessarily occur, even where they mostly do. For example, a
Newtonian description of the collision of billiard balls is certainly quite precise,
but it cannot take into account the particular conditions, such as, for example,
wind and humidity, the worn nap and uneven corners of the billiard table, not to
mention the competence of the billiard players, and their flickering mindstates.
Scientific laws of nature take place under a ceteris paribus clause, that is, the
condition of ‘‘all other things being equal’’—what they seldom are. I fully agree
that the ‘‘unreasonable effectiveness’’ of applied mathematics suggests to us that
one must assume some nice anchorage of mathematical models in real-world law-
like behavior.16 It is not advisable to be a postmodernist constructionist in terms of
scientific knowledge. However, neither is there a compelling reason to take a
rationalistic worldview, according to which all things are always the same.
‘‘If you’ve seen one electron, you’ve seen all of them,’’ Richard Feynman once
rightly said. However, if you have seen one virus, you have not seen all of them,
and if you have seen one billiard player, you have not seen all of them. Empirical
reality is much more rugged and uneven than mathematical equations seem to
suggest.
Now I can almost immediately hear Bob the physicist respond, ‘‘You’re right,
Niels, at least from a practical perspective, but also remember that the boundary
conditions of the billiard balls could be described from the perspective of classical
physics, and they also happen to be nicely deterministic.’’ ‘‘Yes,’’ I would respond,
‘‘but a purely mechanical description is not able, even in principle, to single out
the relevant boundary conditions for a particular prediction, say, the breadth of the
individual billiard player, their competitive or playful interactions, and the ever-
changing brain states of the players, and so on.’’ I can also imagine Bob, the
committed science-and-religion scholar say to me,
Well, Niels, I am also a Christian, so I agree that many things could happen that
transcend our scientific models; at a personal level I am even prepared to concede
that God, in a particular situation, might help you to be a better billiard player than
you actually are. But see, I’m committed to perform a dialogue between theology
and the sciences, where I take scientific models utmost seriously, as seriously as I in
personal life try to take my Christian faith. It seems to me, Niels, that by taking a
purely descriptive view of scientific laws, you’re making your theological case a
little too easy. I’m trying to play the game of science and religion following the
rules. I’m even assuming a worst-case scenario, in which the deterministic laws of
classical physics are simply correct (within the limits provided by quantum theory,
which happens to be a more fundamental model). It seems to me, that you,
by comparison, risk the danger of playing tennis while lowering the net, when it’s
your turn.
This is forceful critique, and I am ready to follow Russell’s standard of playing
the game on an equal basis. My response, however, is two-fold. I would like first
to reiterate the aforementioned point that a theologian entering the dialogue
between religion and science, should indeed also enter the game of establishing
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coherence relations, so as to achieve, wherever possible, a ‘‘cognitive equilibrium’’
(to use Philip Clayton’s term). And theologians should also be prepared to face the
cases, where there may actually be conflicts between science and theology (for
example, concerning the far-future of the universe, or the possibility of altruism in
social evolution). Such conflict may lead theology to serious revisions. However,
I do not accept the presupposition that physics is the prevalent player in the game,
or that physics is the final arbiter when it comes to discuss the complex world of
evolutionary world. I wish to take the existing sciences seriously by evaluating—
in discussion with self-reflective proponents of disciplines—where the different
scientific disciplines have explanatory competence, and where they do not. The
reason why I take the patchwork view of scientific explanations seriously, is that
monocausal models are often not capable of delivering the explanations they claim
to explain. There exits, as a matter of fact, no sustained molecular explanation of
evolution. Explanatory pluralism is not only a fact of life: it is also, a fact of the
empirical sciences, as Nancy Cartwright has reminded us.
To put it in terms of tennis: Being a habitual player myself, I am painfully aware
of the mechanics of the game. It is—seen from one perspective—all about hitting
the ball the right mechanical way with your racket under the boundary conditions
of wind and weather (which makes Newtonian physics relevant); but it is also
about apportioning your energy (which makes thermodynamics relevant); and
about knowing when to hit hard and when to hit soft (which makes some
computational experience relevant). However, it is also a rule-governed game,
where the rules are defined socially in terms of the meaning of nets, lines, the
position of the server, and when to apply this or that line (which makes a social
analysis relevant); finally, it is about your own twenty years of practice, and not
least about your motivation. Tennis, indeed, is a game with many parameters that
cannot be written into one formula. However, for sure I know that the match in
front of me cannot easily be computed.
I thus believe that Russell overestimates the importance of physical determinism
for evolutionary processes, and that quantum mechanics is not the only source of
evolutionary novelty. Let us assume that the underlying laws of nature in our
medium-size world are best described in terms of deterministic causal models,
such as Newtonian gravity, Maxwell’s electromagnetism and Boltzmann’s
thermodynamics. From a philosophical perspective, the explanatory success of
deterministic equations does not imply that the real physical world is therefore
simply deterministic. There is no reason for being an uncritical realist concerning
laws of nature (be they deterministic or not). Also seen from an evolutionary
perspective, there is no warrant for believing that the laws of physics explain the
particular features of living beings, not to mention conscious beings. Even if the
deterministic laws of physics and chemistry were to have ruled our universe
exactly as they our equations predict (granting a naı¨ve realism ex hypothesi) and
even if these laws on their operations may have paved the way for the emergence
of living systems (around 4 billion years ago), the causal schemes of physics, be
they quantum theoretical or classical, would not able to explain features of
biological life, once life came into being. Physics and chemistry may determine what
is evolutionarily possible and what is not, and may explain the route from
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anorganic to organic chemistry, but are incapacitated when it comes to explain the
novel features of particular living systems, or the general course of evolution.
Almost all theoretical biologists would agree on this point. The lesson to be learnt
for philosophers and theologians is, I think, to accept explanatory scientific
pluralism in the dialogue of science and theology. In this picture, the determinism
implied by classical physics does hardly pose really hard problems for a strong
notion of special divine action.17
Is coherence enough?
Space does not permit me to respond appropriately to the responses by Nancey
Murphy and Philip Clayton. Each in their way ask me whether it is enough for
theology to re-describe scientific theories. How can a contextual coherence theory
secure that I am not—on the one hand—cherry-picking theologically comforting
biological theories (Clayton), and—on the other hand—have a real feedback effect
on the sciences involved in the dialogue (Murphy). Murphy and Clayton have the
best conceivable background for asking me these questions. Murphy has laid out
an impressive program for theology as an empirical research program in her
landmark book Theology in an Age of Scientific Reasoning (Cornell University Press,
1990) and Philip Clayton has in Explanation from Physics and Theology (Yale
University Press, 1989), clarified the many meanings of explanation in various
research programs, some harder and some softer. I am grateful for their
challenging responses.
Clayton rightly points to John Rawls’ notion of a ‘‘reflective equilibrium’’ as my
guiding ideal for the dialogue between theology and the sciences.18 For indeed,
my position concerning ‘‘contextual coherence’’ (as learned from Nicholas
Rescher)19 implies that there are two partners in the dialogue, and not just one
candidate for truth to which theology should accommodate itself.
Clayton asks me to consider six alternative interpretations of biological
interpretation (progressive evolution; convergent evolution; neutral directionality;
no progress; Gould’s modified neo-Darwinism, Dawkins’ sheer chance). He points
out that each of these views has different ‘‘implications for theology,’’ and he even
suggests that on the two last views of evolution, theology is actually ‘‘counter-
indicated.’’ Clayton has a point here, but the question is whether he is not
overstating it. Indeed, there are rival interpretations of evolution. I thus analyzed
conflicting biological theories in some detail in my lecture.20 With Clayton I
believe it is important to make explicit thought experiments: If you have (scientific
interpretation 1,2,3 . . .), and if you have (a given hard core theological assumption,
which (theological options 1,2,3, . . .) would establish a cognitive equilibrium?
Though my own role in the dialogue is that of a systematic theologian, this can
hardly be seen as a ‘‘faith first’’-approach. Clayton’s notion of specific
‘‘implications’’ from science to theology seems to me too simplistic. Most
scientific theories are laden with metaphysical assumptions, which need to be
brought to light and scrutinized from a philosophical perspective. (The question of
the status of laws in physics is one example). Likewise, a considerable degree of
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theological redescription is needed in order to establish a theological truth
candidate, on the basis of which the machinery of contextual coherence can be set
in motion. I here see it as a problem for the dialogue between theology and the
sciences that the theology partner is either not theoriefa¨hig (but only refers to
examples of religious first-order practice), or so general that its theological content
is lacking specificity.
Counter-indications are indeed possible, but usually the problem is that the
coherence relations are so general that they become weak; in this case, there would
no longer be an epistemic warrant for a specific theological redescription. In the case
of Gould, the epistemic warrant for a theology of evolution would be weak in
terms of evolutionary progress, but rich in terms of exemplifying a principle of
plenitude. In the case of Dawkins, there would be a counter-indication, but one
built into his metaphysical assumptions of his theory of the ‘‘selfish gene.’’ As long
as the theological truth candidate is clearly formulated, I cannot see how the
evaluation of weaker and stronger relations of coherence can be like the dressing
and redressing of an endless series of manikins. The theological manikin, to stay
with the metaphor, is quite specific (if a content-rich theology is developed) and
she cannot wear all sorts of garment.
I am more intrigued about another issue, where I think that Clayton and I
have different ideals of rationality, even though we, on material issues, are often
so close. For me rationality is very much about being clear about the domains of
the explanatory power of theories or viewpoints. This goes for science and
theology as well as for ordinary life situations. I am therefore more skeptical
than he is about grand metaphysical schemes (terms such as ‘‘laws of nature’’
‘‘theism’’ or even ‘‘panentheism’’). I always want to inquire, ‘‘which laws, what
status,’’ ‘‘which sort of God do you have in mind here,’’ ‘‘which version of
panenthism do you finally endorse?’’ In other words, I take metaphysical
concepts not as ends, in which one can live and breathe comfortably, but
rather as placeholders or means for developing more content-rich concepts and
theories. Metaphysical concepts are always in need of re-specification (what can
be learnt from the German social philosopher Niklas Luhmann). Clayton, on his
side, feels that I am thinking too much from the inside out, potentially
parochially, and too much thinking in epistemic patchworks, rather than daring
to trace the big lines. We have discussed this matter in conversations, and I think
that we agree about our disagreements of epistemic values. We also agree that
one needs to be able to go both inside out as well as outside in, and that our age
demands of theologians to be capable of thinking comparatively. The difference
is on our primary loci.
Nancey Murphy, in her generous response, puts me in front of a very complex
task, namely to relate my work to Robert John Russell’s encompassing chart of the
possible mutual interactions between theology and the sciences. Before that she
interprets my own interpretation of self-organization and evolution not only
correctly, but also in agreement that such interpretative works needs to be done.
By redescribing, in theological terms, the world of nature as already described and
(partially) explained by the sciences, the sciences are used as pivotal resources for
an enriched theology.
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But here the lines obviously go from the sciences to theology. Now she asks me
whether the line could go the other way: theology impacting sciences. She
classifies my work as mostly within Russell’s fifth path, which is that a scientific
network of theories ‘‘function heuristically in theology by providing conceptual
and other sorts of inspiration.’’21 Her question is now whether theology may not
also review the philosophical assumptions that may be embedded in the sciences.
‘‘Might it be the case that theologians are sometimes in a better position to
recognize metaphysical assumptions in science than the scientists themselves.’’
This can obviously be the case. One outstanding example is the interpretation of
the competition versus cooperation in evolutionary theory. One wonders whether
the decade-long discussions on altruism in evolution would have taken place, if
we were not living in a religious and humanistic culture in which altruism and
generosity is given such emphasis. Theologians also often are better trained in the
history of ideas than the scientists themselves, and thus may contribute to
understanding why one theory, in a given situation, is given prevalence over
another. Why could Niels Bohr live comfortably with paradoxes, while Max Born
opted for a determinist interpretation of quantum theory? Such tasks, however,
are not a theological prerogative, but are philosophical or historical in nature, and
should best be performed in collaboration with specialized philosophers and
historians of science.
Murphy also asks the question how I could place myself in relation to Russell’s
paths 1-4, that put even stronger emphasis on the impact from the sciences to
theology.22
. Path 1. Can scientific theories act directly as data for theology so that a theology
is constrained by a scientific theory? Yes, one example is the pivotal role of
natural selection in evolution that certainly puts constraints on theology. No
theology of creation can avoid picking that grape, sour or not! Similarly,
theologies can lose plausibility via incoherent relationships to science, which
has happened to Teilhard de Chardin’s optimistic theory of an orthogenesis
towards perfection. Not picking grapes can also have fatal effects!
. Path 2: Can scientific theories act directly as data for theology that need to be
explained by theology or taken as a basis for a constructive theological argument? Yes,
and I believe my own work exemplifies this position as well, both concerning
cosmic fine-tuning where theology (as Murphy knows better than most) may
function as a causal explanation, or the view of convergent evolution, where a
theology of creation at least provides a meaningful picture of evolution that
brings the many aspects of convergence into a coherent picture.
. Path 3: Can scientific theories, via philosophical interpretation, act indirectly as data
for theology? Yes, one example discussed above is the importance of an
Aristotelian interpretation of laws of nature for nomological incompatibilism.
. Finally path 4: Can scientific theories act indirectly as data for theology when
incorporated in a philosophy of nature? Yes, there are many examples of this, for
example Whitehead’s philosophy of nature, or in my own reference to a
current worldview of networks. However, as I have indicated briefly above,
and in some lengths in Rethinking Theology and Science,23 I am in general
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skeptical about too general metaphysical worldview assumptions. General-
isations are avoidable, and can be helpful in popularizations. However, grand
scale worldviews may lead both scientists and theologians astray in making
too general assumptions on a too narrow empirical background.
The hard work of the science-theology dialogue, as I see it, lies at Russell’s paths
1, 2, 3, and 5, and I see my work as much in paths 1 – 3 as in 5. This is what I wrote
in my earlier typology of levels of interaction: ‘‘The incorporation of [scientific]
data, theories, and thought models [in theology] is in my view the level where the
coherence model works best by bringing the interlocutors in science and theology
into a rational procedure. There are two other examples of contextual interlinkage,
however, of equal importance, though less susceptible to rationalization: the
exchange of metaphors . . . [and] the level of worldviews.’’24
I am happy to be reminded of this reticence by such an eminent empiricist
philosopher as Nancey Murphy.
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